

Analysis of Graphs for Digital Preservation Suitability

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ABSTRACT

We investigate the use of autonomically created small-world graphs as a framework for the long term storage of digital objects on the Web in a potentially hostile environment. We attack the classic Erdos — Renyi random, Barabási and Albert power law, Watts — Strogatz small world and our Unsupervised Small World (USW) graphs using different attacker strategies and report their respective robustness. Using different attacker profiles, we construct a game where the attacker is allowed to use a strategy of his choice to remove a percentage of each graph's elements. The graph is then allowed to repair some portion of its self. We report on the number of alternating attack and repair turns until either the graph is disconnected, or the game exceeds the number of permitted turns. Based on our analysis, an attack strategy that focuses on removing the vertices with the highest *betweenness* value is most advantageous to the attacker. Power law graphs can become disconnected with the removal of a single edge; random graphs with the removal of as few as 1% of their vertices, small-world graphs with the removal of 14% vertices, and USW with the removal of 17% vertices. Watts — Strogatz small-world graphs are more robust and resilient than random or power law graphs. USW graphs are more robust and resilient than small world graphs. A graph of USW connected WOs filled with data could outlive the individuals and institutions that created the data in an environment where WOs are lost due to random failures or directed attacks.

Categories and Subject Descriptors

H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous;
I.6.8 [Simulation and Modeling]: Types of Simulation;
E.m [Data]: Miscellaneous

General Terms

Algorithms, Experimentation, Reliability, Theory

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Keywords

small world, robustness, resilience

1. INTRODUCTION

We are exploring the creation of web objects (WO) that establish and maintain links between themselves and can live without the intervention of conventional repositories. We are investigating how data inside the WOs could outlive the individuals and institutions that created the data with little or no external guidance or direction making them ideal for use in environments where the stewardship of the data is paramount. WOs can be thought of as having all the properties Kahn-Wilensky Framework digital objects [17] except that they live directly in the Web Architecture [15] and do not require an explicit repository system (e.g., DSpace, Fedora) for management, nor do they require global knowledge of the entire network.

These WOs send messages back and forth between each other and have the desirable small-world characteristics of relatively high clustering coefficients (where there is a high probability that “a friend of a friend is my friend as well”) and a short average path length between any two nodes in the graph. We have developed an Unsupervised Small World (USW) algorithm that creates graphs with the desired characteristics by adding one node at a time to an existing graph. Edges between nodes are created based on local information that each new node discovers from nodes already part of the graph. A graph of these WOs is robust and individual WOs can communicate with one another even when the underlying infrastructure has been damaged or disabled using their internal and locally maintained data structures. Some of the messages that the WOs could exchange might include the location of a service that would migrate data in an “old” format to a “new” one (migration from GIF to JPEG), the location of a new server willing and ready to accept additional WOs for storage (refreshing of the bits), etc. to support preservation efforts.

This is an extension of our prior work on self-contained digital objects [25] and earlier investigations into the creation of self-arranging networks [8]. In this paper we present the simulation results of an algorithm for digital objects to create a small-world Graph without direct supervision by an administrator or repository. Although assistance from administrators or repositories is possible in this model, it is not required. The motivation for and scenarios of how a network of WOs could engage in digital preservation tasks is covered in [9]; this paper presents only the analysis of an algorithm to test the robustness and resilience of such a network.

Milgram [22] is credited with formulating the idea that in a social network, the path length between any two randomly selected individuals in the US in the 1960 was on average between 5 and 6, leading to the phrase “6 degrees of freedom.” An algorithmic technique from a totally ordered k -degree lattice to a random graph passing through a phase that exhibited Milgram’s small-world characteristics was made popular by Watts — Strogatz [32]. Their technique required a k degree lattice as a foundation before a small-world could be constructed.

We would prefer if the WOs could self-organize into a graph exhibiting small-world properties without first creating a regular or random graph as a starting point. Small-world graphs are interesting because they occur frequently in a variety of different fields. They have been found in cellular metabolism, Hollywood actor relationships, Internet routers, protein regulatory networks, research collaborations, sexual relations and World Wide Web page linkages [3]. Furthermore, current methods for small-world graph creation are based on an outside view of the network and an omnipresent/omnipotent view of the graph structure.

We test the robustness and resilience of classical random, power law, small-world and our USW graphs by subjecting each to a set of strategies that an attacker might use to disconnect the graph. We test these graphs by using a game where the attacker and the graph alternate turns. The attacker will be able to inflict damage on the graph (as a test of the graph’s robustness), after which the graph will be able to repair and strengthen itself (as a test of the graph’s resilience). Our efforts are focusing on the performance of the graphs during different stress tests. We are primarily interested in the autonomic processes that create and preserve the graph. By expanding the contents of the node from purely maintenance data to payload data (files, images, or other binary information), the contents of a USW graph could be preserved from loss even in the face of repeated censorship attacks.

2. TYPES OF GRAPHS BASED ON DEGREE DISTRIBUTIONS

Graphs can be classified by many different and overlapping criteria including the presence or absence of well defined structural elements. Randić and DeAlba [30] provide an extensive list of different classifications. Within this paper, we are interested in the classifying graphs by their degree distributions. Those processes can be purely random, power law, classical Watts — Strogatz small-world, or our USW construction process.

Each of these processes generates a graph with distinctively different degree distributions, clustering coefficients (CC) and expected average path lengths. Figure 1 is a plot of representative degree distributions for each of these types of graphs. In Figure 1, the red circles are characteristic of a power law distribution. The black x’s are from a small-world graph and look very much like a random distribution because the underlying methodology for creating the edges is random. The difference between a small-world distribution and a random one is the smallness of the degree distribution σ and having a mean μ that is same as the underlying lattice that was used as the base. While this small-world distribution is ± 4 , a similar random one is ± 10 . A random graph degree distribution is shown with the green triangles, whose




Figure 1: Histogram of representative degree distributions of 1000 node graphs built using random, power law, small-world and USW processes.

μ is centered at $p * n$ and a Poisson distribution for the rest of the degree nodes. The USW construction parameters will affect the center of the blue crosses and where that center lies on the x-axis. USW parameters β and γ were set to 0.95 each in order to separate the USW graph from the other graphs. USW γ affects the left-right location of the center, while β affects the height of the center. The CC for random and small-world graphs are $C \sim \frac{k}{n}$ and $C \sim \frac{3}{4}$ respectively. While the average path lengths are $L \sim \frac{\ln(n)}{\ln(k)}$ and $L \sim \frac{n}{2k}$ respectively [32]. The CC and average path length of power law and USW graphs are not tractable and do not have a closed form solution.

2.1 Random

A random graph is one that is generated by some random process [16, 4]. These graphs can be created by many non-equivalent techniques. At the end of the random graph construction process, the graph may not be connected.

2.2 Power law

Power law graphs are characterized by the fraction of their vertices that have a specified degree k . In general, the degree distribution of a power law graph is given by: $p(k) = ck^{-\delta} |c, \delta > 0$. Preferential attachment graphs are a special case of *Power Law* graphs. Preferential attachment graphs grow over time by the addition of new vertices.

2.3 Small-world

Small-world graphs introduced in [32, 28] begin with a k -lattice and rewiring each edge with a probability p . Small-world graphs may be planar or non-planar and there is a greater than 0 probability that the resulting graph will be neither simple and nor connected. Small-world graphs have distinctive average path length and clustering coefficient properties.

The average distance between any two vertices is small (growing logarithmically with the number of vertices in G). The average clustering coefficient for the graph is high. A clustering coefficient is the fraction of vertices that any two vertices have in common over the complete set of adjacent vertices that the two original vertices have. Random graphs

have low average path distances, but their average clustering coefficients tend towards 0.

2.4 Unsupervised Small World

Unsupervised Small World (USW) graphs are simple, connected non-planar built by the autonomous actions of each node as it is added to the existent graph. USW graphs are characterized by a clustering coefficient and average path length comparable to that of traditional small-world graphs, but markedly different in how they are constructed. The autonomous algorithm that each independent node uses to locate itself within, and thereby grow the USW is detailed in [9, 8].

3. ATTACKER PROFILES

The selection of an attack profile involves is a decision based on many different pieces of data. Included in this list of data is:

- The goal of the attack (for instance complete removal of the graph, or inflicting enough damage to the graph to cause the graph to become disconnected),
- Which metric to use to measure the progress of the attack,
- What type of graph component (edge or vertex) to remove,
- What technique to use to select the most “central” or “vital” component of the graph to remove,
- When the components are ranked based on their centrality, which specific one to select.

3.1 Attack progress metrics

The following metrics will be collected because they relate directly to the ability of the graph to communicate effectively between its WOs, and will change depending on the amount of damage the graph sustains.

Average inverse path length is the inverse of the mean of all the shortest paths in the graph. Because the shortest path between vertices in two different components is ∞ , the inverse is 0 and therefore is a valid value that does not cause the computation to fail. A larger average inverse path length means that the distance between nodes is on average shorter [14].

$$l^{-1} \equiv \left\langle \frac{1}{d(v,w)} \right\rangle \equiv \frac{1}{n(n-1)} \sum_{v \in V} \sum_{w \neq v \in V} \frac{1}{d(v,w)} \quad (1)$$

Average path length is the mean of the all the shortest (geodesic) paths in the graph

$$\bar{d} = \frac{1}{|V|^2 - |V|} \sum_{u \neq v \in V | 0 < d(u,v) < \infty} d(u,v) \quad (2)$$

Clustering Coefficient is the likelihood that two neighbors of v are connected [27, 29]

$$C_{Global} = \frac{3 * \Sigma \text{Number Of Triangles In The Graph}}{\text{Number Of Connected Triples}} \quad (3)$$

Density is the ratio for the edges and nodes that are members of the connected graph [30]

$$\rho = \left(\frac{n^2}{2m} - 1 \right) \left(1 - \frac{1}{n} \right) \quad (4)$$

Damage is the ratio of the largest component to the entire graph [7]

$$\Delta(G) = 1 - \frac{\max(|C_i|) : \forall C \in \{C\}}{n} \quad (5)$$

Diameter is the maximal shortest path between any vertices u and v

$$D(G) = \max\{d(u,v) : u, v \in V\} \quad (6)$$

Where n is the number of nodes in the entire graph, m is the number of edges in the entire graph, p is a probability of connection or rewiring (based on the type of graph).

During the course of the simulation, we expect the following changes in each of the above metrics when the graph conducts maintenance:

Average inverse path length to remain nearly the same or to grow slowly as the graph becomes more and better connected,

Average path length to decrease as more alternative paths are created,

Clustering Coefficients to increase as more triads are created because of the increasing edges,

Density to increase because the graph creates more edges,

Damage to remain nearly static, and

Diameter to decrease as the graph becomes more and better connected.

3.2 Centrality measurements

A centrality measurement is a way of quantifying the notion that some components of a graph are more important than others. Some centrality measurements are based purely on data that is available at the graph component level and are invariant with respect to the rest of the graph; these are called *local* centrality measurements. Other measurements are dependent on the structure of the graph in toto. These are called *global* centrality measurements. The difference between local and global knowledge is fundamentally one of degree using the idea of k - *neighborhood*. In the minimal case where $k = 1$, all knowledge is based on edges and vertices that are 1 edge away. In the maximal case where $k = D(G)$, all knowledge is based on total knowledge of the graph. Values of k from 1 and $D(G)$ reflecting increasing knowledge of G.

3.2.1 Betweenness

Betweenness is a global centrality measurement. Betweenness is a measure of how many geodesic paths from any vertices $s, t \in V$ use either an edge (see Equation 7) or a vertex (see Equation 8). Removal of a graph component based on its betweenness is a direct attack on the global structure of the graph.

$$c_B(e) = \sum_{s \neq t \in V} \frac{\sigma_{st}(e)}{\sigma_{st}} \quad (7)$$

$$c_B(v) = \sum_{s \neq t \in V} \frac{\sigma_{st}(v)}{\sigma_{st}} \quad (8)$$

3.2.2 Closeness

Closeness is a global centrality measurement. Closeness quantifies the idea that a vertex has a shortest average geodesic distance when compared to all geodesic distances.

$$c_C(u) = \sum_{v \in V} d(u, v) \quad (9)$$

3.2.3 Degreeeness

Degreeeness is a local centrality measurement. Degreeeness is the number of edges that are incident to a vertex (see Equation 10). Degreeeness only makes sense for vertices. A vertex with a high degreeeness is central to a local portion of the graph, but not necessarily to the graph in to-to.

$$c_D(v) = d(v) \quad (10)$$

3.3 Extremal values

Selection of an attack profile is dependent on an appropriately selected centrality measurement, the type of graph component (either E or V) to delete and which of these components to delete based on the centrality measurement selected. Any centrality measurement will result in an unordered list of numerical values. Depending on the type of measurement selected, either of the extremal values of **Highest** or **Lowest** will result in the most disruption to the graph.

3.4 Sample profiles

Attacker profiles are described with a three character token created from permuting three disjointed sets. The sets are: $\{D, B, C\}$ representing the centrality measurements **D**egreeeness, **B**etweenness and **C**loseness; $\{E, V\}$ representing graph component to be removed **E**dge and **V**ertex, and $\{L, H\}$ representing which extremal value to use when selecting the component to be removed **L**ow and **H**igh. An example of one permutation is: **B-E-L** meaning that betweenness centrality measurement is being computed, an edge will be selected for removal and the lowest valued edge will be removed.

Each of the different attack profiles is presented with the same graph (see Figure 3). The attack profile continues to execute until the graph is disconnected. In those cases where there are multiple graph components with the same value (vertices of the same degreeeness, edges with the same betweenness, etc.), the attack profile is recursively applied and the total number of deletions is reported. Figure 2 shows the sample graph is prior to the deletion of the first attack profile specific element. Each attack profile assumes that the attacker has complete (i.e., global) knowledge of the graph and so is able to make decisions that are most advantageous to the attacker. How this knowledge is obtained is outside this discussion. The goal of each attack profile is the disconnection of the graph, where disconnection is defined as the inability of vertex i to send a message to vertex j $i \not\leftrightarrow j : \exists i, j \in V$. Therefore a graph with only one vertex is still connected and that removing a vertex that is connected to only one other vertex does not disconnect the graph.

3.5 Efficacy of different attack profiles

Attacker profiles were used recursively against the sample graph until the graph was disconnected. Table 1 reports the efficacy of different attacker profiles used against the sample graph when vertices (or edges) are removed. Computing the centrality value may result in more than one vertex (or edge)




Figure 3: The sample graph presented to each of the attack profile. This graph is used because it has enough interesting vertices and edges so that each attack profile would select a different graph component to remove.

having the same value. Having the same value for two measurements is treated as creating two different graphs that are treated in a recursive manner. For each profile, the number of unique graphs is reported as well as the maximum and minimum recursion depth. A mean (μ) and standard deviation (σ) depths for all profiles are reported. Smaller values for the maximum and minimum depths and σ points to a profile that is always aggressive and effective. Good attack profiles (from the attacker’s perspective) are **D-V-H**, **B-E-H**, or **C-V-L** because these attack the “core” elements of the graph, while the other profiles “nibble at the edges.” The best attack profile is **B-V-H** because it is most destructive at the core. The other attack profiles focus on the periphery and will result in disconnecting the graph or may result in a connected graph that has only one vertex. These peripheral attack profiles take much longer than an attack on the core.

4. IMPLEMENTING RESILIENCY IN GRAPHS OF DIFFERENT FLAVORS


The words robustness and resilience are used almost interchangeably when talking about graphs. But, they are very different attributes that should not be confused.

Robustness [18] is the ability of a graph to keep its basic functionality even under the failure of some of its components. These components can be any combination of the graph’s edges or vertices. A graph $G = (V, E)$ is robust if messages can be sent from $i \rightarrow j : \forall i, j \in V$.


Resilience is the ability of a graph to recover readily from damage and, in a sense to become more *robust*.

Implementing resiliency in support of the Game resolved itself into two different categories based on the underlying mechanisms that were used to create the graph. The “standard” graphs (random, power law, and small-world) have a relatively simple underlying mathematical foundation, while the USW graph is created via a series of algorithmic steps. This division is also reflected in how *resilience* is implemented.


4.1 Non-supervised small-world




(a) B-E-L




(b) B-E-H




(c) B-V-L




(d) B-V-H




(e) D-V-L



(f) D-V-H



(g) C-V-L



(h) C-V-H

Figure 2: The first graph component that will be removed based on different attack profiles. Each profile selects a different component to be removed. In each of these figures, the first component to be removed is shown in red. In cases where more than one component has the appropriate qualities to qualify it for removal; selection of which component to remove is based on random selection.

Attack profile	# of unique graphs	Max. depth	Min. depth	Mean (μ) depth	Std. Dev. (σ) depth
D-V-L	428,580	20	4	15.57	3.65
D-V-H	8	2	1	1.87	0.35
B-E-L	7	6	6	6	0.00
B-E-H	2	2	2	2	0.00
B-V-L	53,155	20	15	19.56	0.82
B-V-H	1	2	2	2	n/a
C-V-L	2,634	20	17	19.89	0.36
C-V-H	4	2	2	2	0.00

Table 1: The efficacy of different recursive attacker profiles against the same sample graph.

Resilience for all “standard” graphs is implemented via the use of R igrph library routines. For all “standard” graphs, it is assumed that 10% of the nodes will be re-activated (via a manner that is outside this discussion) and will attempt to form links to other nodes in the graph. Further it is assumed that only 90% of these attempts will be successful. Connection attempts are not 100% successful in order to simulate downtime at the host where a node lives and timeouts in the communications channels.

4.2 Unsupervised Small World

Unsupervised Small World (USW) graphs are created using a number of control parameters. These parameters autonomously create a graph that has small-world characteristics using only locally gained knowledge. The parameters that were used to create the graph are the same ones that are used to implement resilience.

During the simulation, when the USW graph is written to the database, all the control parameters (α, β, γ and others) are also written. When the USW graph is to be reconstituted, the original control parameters are used to reconstitute the graph.

5. THE GAME

A *Game* is a competitive activity involving skill, chance, or endurance between two or more players who play according to a set of rules to achieve some goal. There are two players in this game: Alice (the person responsible for repairing the graph) and Mallory (the attacker).

A graph may be subject to different types of damage. Damage resulting from a random event or occurrence can be classified as is an error [1]. While, damage from something other than a random act, is classified as an attack. For example, loss of a single router in a computer network could be viewed as a random event. Loss of all routers at the same time would be called an attack. Structurally different types of graphs (random, power law, small-world) [20, 24, 10, 31, 33, 18, 6, 26, 5] are robust in different ways when the same number of graph components are lost.

Albert, Jeong and Barabási [1] focus on power law, networks such as the World-Wide Web, the Internet, social networks and cells. They conclude that these networks have are tolerant to many random failures, but are very susceptible to the failure of a few critical elements because of their underlying structure. This type of sensitivity is common to power law networks. USW is not a power law graph and is not sensitive to targeted attacks.

Moreno, Pastor-Satorras et al, [23] focus on the effects of a cascading failure in a power law network. Using their analysis, they identified a critical load in the traffic through a failed network component above which the resulting traffic congestion will destroy network communications. This critical threshold is based on the idea that each component has a communications tolerance that when exceeded causes the component to fail. By keeping these limitations in mind, USW graphs have been designed without tolerances and are able to send as much traffic as the underlying Web architecture can support. Zio and Sansavini [33] expand on the ideas of Moreno and Pastor-Satorras by exploring small-world graphs as well. Zio and Sansavini go on to quantify the amount of excess capacity (of a normalized loading) that each node in both types of graphs must have to prevent cascading failures.

Guillaume, Latapy and Magnien [13] extend Albert, Jeong and Barabási investigation to include random graphs. They show that the removal of a similar number of edges for the two graph types will result in a disconnected graph, and then propose an efficient attack strategy based on removal of edges. The attack ideas were incorporated into the attack profiles used to test the robustness and resilience of the USW graphs.

Motter and Lai [24] focus on the effects of cascading failures due to overloading of the Internet and power grids. In these types of graphs the traffic when a component fails, the traffic (be it either packets or electrical power) being serviced by that component is transferred to other components of the same type to which the failed component was connected. Their analysis shows that an attack, or a failure of an exceptionally heavily loaded component may have a cascading failure affect on other components. Traffic between USW components are not bound or limited except by the underlying Web Architecture and are those immune from these types of cascading failures.

Farkas, Antal, et al. [12] proposed imbuing an ethernet network with a distributed resilient architecture based on the use of multiple static routes stored in routers spread across the network. In the event that a router were to fail, or become unavailable, the connected routers would immediately begin using the secondary spanning tree routes. These secondary routes would be maintained in addition to the primary routes. The USW model does not maintain static or dynamic routes.

Criado, Flores, et al. [10] propose two measures to assess the robustness of a graph to random and intentional attacks. These measures take into account the graph’s topology and

is computable in polynomial time. Their measures can be viewed as another type of centrality where the node (or edge) whose presence means that the graph is less vulnerable and whose absence would make the graph more vulnerable. The evaluation of the vulnerability of USW graphs will take their ideas into consideration.

Netotea and Pongor [26] take as input a graph and through evolution increase its efficiency and robustness by rewiring the graph. They take existing an existing edge and move one end to a different node and then measuring the efficiency of the graph at each stage. Their definition of efficiency is:

$$E = \frac{1}{n(n+1)} \sum_{i \neq j \in V} \frac{1}{d_{ij}} \quad (11)$$

whereby the average distance between all nodes decreases. They define robustness at time t as $R = \frac{E_t}{E}$. Within USW, once edges are created, they are not removed or altered. The efficiency of the USW graph will increase by the addition of more nodes and edges.

5.1 The goal

Our goal for the game is to determine the *robustness* of selected graph types in the face of different types of attacks (*attacker profiles*) and how *resilient* each graph type is when given an opportunity to recover from some of the damage suffered in the attack. The game seeks to answer the question: how many edges or nodes can the attacker remove before the graph was disconnected? Different attack profiles will be exercised and the worst type of attack (i.e., the one with the highest likelihood of success from the attacker’s perspective) will be identified. Each of the graphs described in Section 2 will compete against a set of attack profiles. Each attack will use a different and unchanging profile against the graph. The game is over when either: the graph is disconnected, or the simulation runs to an end.

5.2 The players

During the game; Mallory will have global knowledge of the graph (how this knowledge was obtained is not part of the game) and can choose to remove any graph component (either edge or vertex) that he feels is to his benefit. Alice has only local knowledge and does not know how or where the next attack will occur. After the Mallory’s turn, Alice will have a turn to reconstitute the graph in preparation for the next attack. Mallory and Alice will alternate turns until one wins. The goal of the game from the Mallory’s perspective is to cause the graph to become disconnected and therefore Alice would not be able to use the graph to send a message to Bob. The goal from the Alice’s perspective is to remain connected as long as possible.

5.3 The rules

There are few rules in this game. They are:

1. The graph is created without any interference from Mallory.
2. Once Mallory chooses an attack profile, he must use that same profile for the duration of the game.
3. The number (or percentage) of graph components that Mallory can damage per turn is fixed at the start of the game.
4. The number (or percentage) of graph components that Alice can reconstitute per turn remains fixed for the duration of the game.
5. The game is over if the graph is disconnected at the end of Mallory’s turn, or the number of game turns reaches the maximum number allowed.

If at the end of the game the graph is disconnected then Mallory has won, otherwise Alice has won.

5.4 A sample game

Data are collected and analyzed during the course of the game between Mallory and Alice. A specific instance of a 10 turn game is shown in Figures 4 and 5. A power law degree distribution graph was created and a **D-V-H** attack profile was used for 10 turns against the graph. As can be seen in Figure 4 the induced subgraph was severely damaged during the first 3 turns and then less damaged later. Two of nine turns are highlighted. During turn 2, the damage induced by vertex deletion increases during the turn and the overall damage to the graph is shown at the end of the turn. During turn 4, there is minimal damage to the subgraph and the overall damage to the total graph is low. The worst damage was done to graph by the end of the fourth turn, after which the graph had reconstituted itself enough to withstand future attacks.

6. GRAPHS TAKEN TO DISCONNECTION

6.1 What data was collected

At the end of each turn, the following measurements or characteristics are collected and presented: average path, clustering coefficient, density and diameter.

The y-axis is normalized from 0 to 1 for all figures. The x-axis is linear and represents the “shot” taken by the Mallory at the graph. Mallory had 100 shots (10% of a 1000 vertex graph) per turn.

6.2 How graphs were created

The R igraph package [11] was used to create the “standard” graphs from Section 2. The USW graph creator program was set up to run with all possible combinations of first attachment, node visitation and queue processing policies and 4 values each for β and γ . Every graph was attacked based on degree, betweenness and closeness for either edge or node as appropriate and for each possible extremal value

6.2.1 Non-supervised small-world

The R package igraph functions `erdos.renyi.game()`, `barabasi.game()` and `watts.strogatz.game()` were used to create random, power law and small-world graphs respectively of 1000 nodes each. Each graph was checked to ensure that it was simple and connected.

6.2.2 Unsupervised Small World graphs

A complete description of the USW construction process can be found in [9, 8]. The dominant control parameters for the destruction game are:

- a (β) the threshold that a locally generated random number must exceed before an edge can be created between two nodes




Figure 4: Deletion (shot) by deletion plot of damage to a power law degree graph. The red line presents the damage to the graph at the end of a turn. Each marker on the red line indicates the end of a turn. The blue line is the damage at the start of a turn. The black markers represent the damage done to an induced subgraph where the path length (PL) from the root node is 2.




Figure 5: Turn by turn plot of damage to a power law degree distribution graph. The red line presents the damage to the graph at the end of a turn. The blue line is the damage at the start of a turn.

Graph type	Degreeness		Betweenness				Closeness	
	Lowest	Highest	Edge		Node		Lowest	Highest
			Lowest	Highest	Lowest	Highest		
Random (Erdos — Renyi)	99	31	344	6	99	14	99	23
Power law (Barabasi)	99	1	1	1	99	1	99	1
Small-world (Watts — Strogatz)	99	65	355	85	99	10	99	21
USW	99	65 — 99	1100 — 31000	13 — 60	99	35 — 99	99	70 — 90

Table 2: A comparison of how many graph elements (either edges or vertices) must be removed before the graph becomes disconnected.

Attack profile	Efficacy this is the one
[BD][EV]L	“Nibbles” away at the least important component, gnawing at the graph until a critical component (or the last node) is reached.
[BD][EV]H	Attacks the most critical/needed part of the graph and is able to disconnect the graph after a relatively few number of removals.
CVL	Removes the node that is “closest” to all nodes and forcing another to become the closest.
CVH	“Nibbles” away at the periphery (in a closeness sense) of the graph and continues to do so until there is only one component left or a disconnection.

Table 3: A summary of efficacy of different attack profiles.

- p** (γ) the percentage of nodes that failed or have never been considered for a connecting edge that will be used once the β threshold test has been satisfied
- t** the percentage of the graph selected for re-constitution to support resiliency corrective actions will attempt to connect to using both the initial β and γ values
- L** the number of nodes that will be randomly selected for re-constitution actions

Table 2 itemizes the results of the various attack profiles against the “standard” and USW graphs.

7. DISCUSSION

Mallory is in a much stronger position than Alice. Mallory’s knowledge of the graph is only limited by the amount of time and energy that he wishes to expend exploring the graph. If the depth of the graph that Mallory wishes to explore is called path length (PL), then the range on the size of the induced subgraph he will discover could grow exponentially based on PL (see Equation 12).

$$S = \begin{cases} (2 * PL, D(G)) & \text{if Power Law} \\ \langle k \rangle^{PL} & \text{if Random} \\ (2 * PL, D(G)) & \text{if Watts—Strogatz small-world} \end{cases} \quad (12)$$

Where $\langle k \rangle = \frac{2m}{n} = p(n-1) \approx pn$ is the average number of edges adjacent to any node in the graph.

Even modest increases in PL (for example from 2 to 5) can have profound effect on the size of the induced subgraph. By way of illustration, it has been estimated that the entire Internet is no more that 19 clicks (edges or PL) in size [2].

Alice is a severe disadvantage. She is limited to purely local knowledge (i.e., PL = 1), and can only randomly select which nodes to use to reconstitute the graph. The percentage of vertices that she can activate has to be high enough to have a reasonable expectation of overlapping those graph components that Mallory has attacked. If Alice can cover those components that Mallory has affected then the graph

will continue to survive, otherwise it is inevitable that the graph will become disconnected.

Data from Table 2 was used to bound the region where the USW graphs are most vulnerable (most vulnerable means that the attacker can remove the fewest elements and disconnect the graph). Table 3 summarizes the comments in the previous subsections about the efficacy of the different attack profiles. After evaluating the efficacy of the various attacker profiles; **B-V-H** was selected as best (from the attacker’s perspective).

8. CONCLUSIONS

We have demonstrated that a graph of WOs created based on the USW algorithm is both robust and resilient in a simulation environment. The next major step will be to take it from the theoretical environment and to a real-world implementation. One possible implementation is to further the ideas in [21] by writing and fielding a Firefox plugin using the Open Archives Initiative (OAI) Object Reuse and Exchange (ORE) model from [19] to identify data that could be submitted to a digital library for preservation. These WOs would be monitored for some length of time in order to see how well reality matches the simulations.

We investigated the efficacy of various attack profiles on a graph of web objects. The most effective (i.e., the most destructive) is when the attacker uses a **Betweenness Vertex High** centrality measurements to select which vertex to remove. The size of the subgraph that the attacker can focus on is dependent on the graph’s average degree connectivity $\delta(G)$ and is exponential on the Path Length from a root node. If the number of graph components an attacker can remove is greater than the number that can be reconstituted then the graph will eventually be destroyed. Based on simulations, the Unsupervised Small World (USW) graphs are more robust and resilient than those constructed using classical random, power law, or Watt—Strogatz techniques. A graph of USW connected WOs filled with data could outlive the individuals and institutions that created the data

even in an environment where WOs are lost due to random failures or directed attacks.

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